Introduction
As shown in [1] [2] [3] , classical methods of error detection are not effective when the error distribution of a device is unknown or controlled by anattacker; they do not give the possibility to minimize the worst error masking probability. The majority of currently used linear and nonlinear codes have a set of undetectable errors, and their injection could compromise security in encoding devices. If an error configuration is controlled by an attacker, then he can produce an error changing of a correct codeword into a wrong codeword, exceeding the correction ability of the used code. In the case of linear codes, undetectable errors are codewords, so it is enough for the attacker to know only the code, used in the device, for the error injection. One of the models for error injection is algebraic manipulation. This model assumes that the attacker is able to modify the value of some abstract data storage devices without having read-access to the data. This model can be used for memory security [4] [5] [6] , and for the other systems, such as secret sharing schemes [7] . In these cases, error configuration is absolutely unpredictable and depends on the attacker's capabilities and method of fault injection.
The solution for the problem of algebraic manipulation was firstly introduced by Cramer et al [7] . Algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes may, in some sense, be viewed as keyless combinatorial authentication codes that provide security in the presence of an oblivious algebraic attacker. Its original applications included robust fuzzy extractors, secure message transmission and robust secret sharing. In recent years, however, a rather diverse array of additional applications in cryptography has emerged.
The nonuniformity of input values opens up wide opportunities for an attacker introducing errors, when he is able to find correlations between the error masking probability distributions for some encoding function and the probability distributions of the inputs. This correlation more likely enables the introduction of an error in the device, because in this case the probability of error masking is dependent on the input values. Today this question is being studied in details. There is a mechanism to reduce the maximum of error masking probability by Gray mapping [8] . However, in the paper [8] the authors do not analyse the effect of the encoding function parameters on minimization of the error masking probability. This paper compares the error masking probability for several AMD codes basedon PN functions in cases of uneven distribution of the input codewords. As a PN function, we take the so-called Maiorana -McFarland functions defined as follows: denoting input by ( , ) with , ∈ 2 /2, we have ( , ) = × π( ), where π is a permutation on 2 /2 . We consider, in particular, 1 ( , ) = , 2 ( , ) = −1 and 3 ( , ) = 3 (with the convention 0 −1 = 0 in the second case and with /2 odd in the latter case so that → 3 is a permutation). The purpose of the comparison is to identify the relationships between the probability of error masking and distribution of input values that enable an attacker to accelerate the error finding with the high probability of errors masking.
In the analysis of the encoding functions, the following issues are discussed in details:  the error masking probability of encoding functions with the same nonlinearity and the code redundancy;  what is the effect of changing the irreducible polynomial chosen to build the finite field, over which the PN function is defined. For each probability distribution of error masking investigated, the following parameters are analyzed:  maximums of error masking probability;  number of the error masking probability maximums for given distributions;  number of errors with error masking probability exceeding 0.5 (so-called "bad errors").
The studies carried out are also applicable to the class of wavelet robust codes presented in the works [9, 10] .
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Algebraic Manipulation Detection code
The model of algebraic manipulation over an abstract storage device has been firstly described by Cramer et al. in [11] and presented in Figure 1 . Such device is denoted by ∑ ( ) and can hold an element from a finite Abelian group . An attacker is not able to obtain any information about the element stored in the device ∑ ( ). However, he can change the stored element by adding another element ∈ . This tampering is called an algebraic manipulation. After algebraic manipulation, the abstract storage device ∑ ( ) will store the value + , we will call an error. An adversary can choose the value only on the basis of what he already knew about before it was stored in the device (his a priori knowledge of ). AMD codes are supposed to encode an original information ∈ as an element of ∈ in such way that any algebraic manipulation is detected with high probability. It is known that the best option is to choose a perfect nonlinear function [12] for this encoding mapping. But this option is in fact optimal under the condition that the input distribution is uniform. In this paper, we analyse the case of non-uniform input distribution of AMD codes. In the paper [11] Cramer et al. presents two types of injection attack: weak and strong. In weak attack, the adversary cannot choose the inputs. So, from the adversary's point of view the source is uniformly distributed and the attacker only can inject any specific error pattern in the storage device ∑ ( ), but he cannot change value at his own discretion.
In case of strong attack, the adversary can influence the outputs by choosing the inputs. In this case the adversary knows the value ∈ and, moreover, he can choose it himself. In both types of fault injection attacks the value stored in ∑ ( ) is hidden from the attacker.
Definition 1 [11] . Let and be two positive integers. An ( , ) AMD code is a pair of a probabilistic encoding functions : → from a set of size into a finite Abelian group of order , and a deterministic decoding function : → ∪ {⊥} such that ( ( )) = with probability 1 for every ∈ , where ⊥ denotes combinations which are not included in the code.
An AMD code is called "systematic" if set is a group and the encoding function has the form : → × 1 × 2 → ( , , ( , )), for a function , with being randomly chosen with uniform probability in 1 .
Definition 2 [11] . An AMD code is called weak ε-secure, ε > 0 if, for every chosen at random from and for every ∈ sampled from according to some distribution independent of and ( ), the probability that ( ( ) + ) ∉ { , ⊥} is at most ε.
So in the system with an AMD code, when the decoding function gives the correct value with probability 1 − or the special symbol ⊥, it means that algebraic manipulation has been detected. Definition 3 [11] . An AMD code is called strong ε-secure for ε > 0 if, for every ∈ sampled at random from and for every ∈ sampled from according to some distribution independent of ( ), the probability that ( ( ) + ) ∉ { , ⊥} is at most ε.
Original information (input codewords). In practice, s is nonuniform distributed s  S
Injection of error e
Encoder of securityoriented code
1055 Before Cramer's work, in the works written by Mark Karpovsky et al [1, 13] the notion of robust code was presented, which is related to deterministic weak AMD code: Definition 4 [6] . A code ∈ (2 ) is -robust if the size of the intersection of the code and any of its translates = { | = + , ∈ }, ∈ (2 ), ≠ 0 is upper bounded by : = max 0≠ (2 ) |{ | ∈ , + ∈ }| where + is the componentwise addition modular two. A binary -robust code of length with = ( ) is denoted by a triple ( , , ) ( Figure 2 ).
Figure 2. Definition of robust code
The code (which is not necessarily linear) is supposed systematic: there exists a subset of positions in codewords, called an information set of , such that every possible tuple of length | | occurs in exactly one codeword within the specified coordinates : ∈ . The code equals then, up to a permutation of the codeword coordinates: {( , ( )); ∈ } where is a subgroup of , for some (non necessarily linear) function , and the encoding function : → is then ( ) = ( , ( )).
The probability of missing an algebraic manipulation ε with such a robust code equals the so-called probability of error masking, which is denoted ( ) and is defined as:
The maximum probability of error masking max ≠0 ( ) is directly related to the robustness order of code max ≠0 ( ) = ( ) . Weak AMD codes must provide the detection of algebraic manipulation with security parameter for the set of errors (0 ≠ , , ), on condition that the information part contains an error ≠ 0. Thus, the weak AMD codes are not tested for the set of errors with zero information part (0 = , , ). Mark Karpovsky in [14] writes that ≠ 0 is a necessary condition for successful algebraic manipulation. However, for secure architectures, the integrity of redundant bits of codes is also important. For example, errors ( , = 0) have a high probability of error masking for some multilinear arithmetic codes [15] . Thus, it is necessary to perform analysis for the whole set of errors, not just for errors in the information part. Strong AMD codes must consider the case when the adversary injects errors, but does not alter the value , as successful algebraic manipulation. That is, in strong AMD codes, injection of errors in redundancy part (and also in random part) of codeword must be detected with probability that ( ( ) + ) ∉ {⊥} bounded above by ε. Examples of strong AMD codes are given in [16] Section 3 and [11] Section 6.
In this section, the main definitions of the AMD code theory are presented. The main characteristics of these structures are outlined.
Robustness and max Q(e) for perfect nonlinear functions
In the late 1980s the importance of highly nonlinear functions in cryptography was first discovered by Meier and Staffelbach from the point of view of correlation attacks on stream ciphers, and later by Nyberg in the early 1990s after the introduction of the differential cryptanalysis method. Perfect nonlinear (PN) and almost perfect nonlinear (APN) functions, which have the optimal properties for offering resistance against differential cryptanalysis, have since then been an object of intensive study by many mathematicians.
Perfect nonlinear functions play an important role in robust codes or deterministic weak algebraic manipulation detection codes also. The best possible codes which have maximum possible number of codewords for a given length and robustness are optimum robust codes which have perfect nonlinear encoding function.
Proposition. Let = {( , ( )), ∈ 2 }, where is a vectorial function from 2 to 2 , with and non-negative. Then C is optimum robust if and only if is perfect nonlinear.
In the case of weak model of algebraic manipulation, the robustness and the error masking probability ( ) are defined by the encoding function . In particular, under uniform distribution of input codeword, the error masking probability of a code based on a PN function ( ) is bounded above by 1/2 . Indeed, denoting 
For every ≠ 0, this size equals 2 − by the definition of PN functions, and for = 0, ≠ 0 it is null.
Since has size 2 , this gives max ≠0 ( ) =
Example 1. Let us consider the distribution of error masking probability of the systematic code with codewords ( , , ), , ∈ 2 based on the PN function ( , ) = with = 2. The error vector is = ( , , ) ≠ (0,0,0), and we have ∩ ( + ) = {( , , ); ( + )( + ) = + } = {( , , ); + = + }, and the error masking probability equals to 2 −2 if ( , ) ≠ (0,0), whatever is , and 0 if ( , ) = (0,0) since then we have ≠ 0. Triples ( , , ) are represented by the decimal numbers whose binary expansions are equal to these triples.
There are three errors { = 0, = 0, ≠ 0} that are always detected by above described code ( ( ) = 0). Indeed, these errors are: = 00, = 00, = 01; = 00, = 00, = 10; = 00, = 00, = 11.
This section shows the relationship between the nonlinearity of the coding function and the reliability of the code. Also the part explains why, for uniform distribution, the max ( ) is bounded above by 1/2 .
PN functions under different nonuniform distribution of input codewords
Robust codes do not provide protection against the strong model of algebraic manipulation. If there is a dependence between the data entered in the device and the manipulation, such that the distortion takes the value of the difference between a current codeword and any other one, then this distortion cannot be detected with a high probability.
Example 2. Let the distribution of the input codewords be nonuniform. Assume, there is a function ϕ( ) that determines the probability of occurrence of a given information message ∈ at the input of abstract storage device ∑ ( ) described above. Then, the error masking probability under nonuniform distribution of the outputs for given code equals ( ) = ∑ + ∈ ϕ( ) [8] , where is the codeword corresponding to input information (we have ∈ by construction). For simplicity of reading, all binary vectors will be represented as integers. For instance, the distribution of error masking probability of optimum robust code ( , , ), , ∈ The set of errors { = 0, = 0, ≠ 0} that are always detected (i.e. such that ( ) = 0) by code is unchanged. The maximum of error masking probability drastically increases from 0.25 to 0.52, and we know that injection of errors with the high masking probability are dangerous for protected device. Moreover, optimum robust code under nonuniform distribution of input codeword already does not provide equal probabilities of detection for all possible errors.
To protect against strong algebraic manipulation, it is necessary to get rid of deterministic encoding procedures [15, 5] . For deterministic encoding functions, there is one correspondence between the input values and codeword = ( , ( )). Therefore, the probability of occurrence of input values has a direct impact on the codewords. That is, if the probability of occurrence of the input value ( 1 ) equals to 0.8, then the probability of a corresponding codeword ( 1 ) is also equal to 0.8. So, deterministic encoding functions do not prevent the 1057 analysis of code for searching a high probability of error masking. For providing randomness, the encoding process can be performed with the help of a random variable that is independent of the input data . For such stochastic encoding, each input value corresponds to the set of codewords = { ( , 1 , ( 1 , )) , . . . , ( , , ( , ))}, where depends on the length of the random part . Thus, even for the same input values, the output may be different. One input value corresponds to a few codewords; each one has its own set of errors with high probability masking. Indeed, to calculate the probability of error masking ( ) for all , we need to count all sum + for all errors and for all codewords . Thus, the maximum value of ( ) corresponds to several codewords ′ such that {( ∩ ( + )), + = { + ′ , ′ ∈ }} is performed. For a deterministic function, attacker can select one of these codewords ′, and find the corresponding input value ′. Inputting the value ′ and the simultaneous introduction of error can compromise the encoding device. In the stochastic coding, input of values ′ does not guarantee that we will get the required codeword ′.
Let us consider the codes 1 = {( , ( )), ∈ 2 } and 2 = {( , , ( , )), ∈ 2 , ∈ 2 } (with ( ) ∈ 2 , ( , ) ∈ 2 ), under some nonuniform distribution ϕ( ). For deterministic version 1 , the probability of codeword occurrence of equals to ϕ( ). For stochastic version 2 , the probability of codeword occurrence of equals to ϕ( )2 . For analysing all possible combinations, the attacker can either control the random number generator (RNG) in the encoding device or have the ability to send the input to the device until all combinations have been received. Thus, the attacker is able to compute a set of possible codewords ( , ), but not the encoded version of input .
The computational complexity of the probabilistic encoding function for AMD codes depends on both the complexity of obtaining the random part and the complexity of encoding function ( , ). In cryptographic applications and devices, the random part can be generated by a RNG, that is already used in most of the modern cryptographic devices. In any case the probabilistic AMD codes have higher computational complexity than the robust codes (deterministic AMD codes). If there are problems with the generation of random values or if the computation power is not sufficient, it is preferable to use robust codes. But robust codes are poorly investigated in the case of nonuniformly distributed input . This paper investigates the behavior of PN functions under non-uniform input different distribution.
The paper compares the following power PN functions: 
Comparison of PN functions for r=2
We compared the functions already discussed earlier: and −1 , where , ∈ 2 are two parts of information of equal length . These two functions have the same value of robustness and the maximum of error masking probability. Indeed, both encoding functions are perfect nonlinear functions, hence max ≠0 ( ) = 1/2 . Comparison of the functions ( , ) = and ( , ) = −1 for various distributions and value = 2 is shown in Table 1 . Table 1 . Comparison of the error masking probability for the functions ( , ) = and ( , ) = −1 for value = 2 over irreducible polynomial 2 + + 1. denotes the codeword of code and ϕ( ) probability of codeword occurrence
In the case of a uniform distribution, the probability of codeword occurrence is the same for every input, or, in other words, ϕ( 1 ) = ϕ( 2 ) =. . . = ϕ( 2 2 ).
Bernouilli distribution of parameter ∈ [0; 1] that is:
. There is no difference between codes based on these functions. For = 2 most codewords in both codes coincide. These two codes are different in 6 codewords.
The difference between codes will be more explicit if we explore the functions for higher value of , for example 4 and 5, but then a huge number of comparisons is needed for each codes (for example, for = 4, the КОДЫ, ОБНАРУЖИВАЮЩИЕ АЛГЕБРАИЧЕСКИЕ МАНИПУЛЯЦИИ … Научно-технический вестник информационных технологий, механики и оптики, 2017, том 17, № 6 1058 number of codewords is 2 8 , the error space is 2 12 ).
Comparing the behavior of PN functions for r=3 under two irreducible polynomials For comparison, the following PN functions have been chosen: ( , ) = , ( , ) = −1 , ( , ) = 3 , ( , ) = −3 , where , ∈ 2 are information parts of length equal to (supposed odd in the case of the two last functions so that → 3 is bijective that is a necessary and sufficient condition for ( , ) = 3 and ( , ) = −3 to be PN). We checked that for other choices of irreducible polynomials the maximum of error masking probability has not changed essentially. If we compare the max ( ) over irreducible polynomial 3 + 2 + 1 and 3 + + 1 it is seen that the differences are small. Table 2 presents the values for the same functions but for irreducible polynomial 3 + 2 + 1 (probability distributions of error masking ( ) are different, but the maximum value of ( ) remains unchanged in most cases). Table 2 . Comparison of maximum error masking probability for the functions ( , ) = , ( , ) = −1 , ( , ) = 3 and ( , ) = −3 for value = 3 over irreducible polynomial 3 + + 1
Measurements of the masking probability over irreducible polynomial 3 + 2 + 1 for distributions ϕ 1 ( ), ϕ 2 ( ), ϕ 3 ( ), ϕ 4 ( ) yield results that coincide with a deviation of 0.05 with results in Table 2 . For = 3, −1 = 6 is linearly equivalent to 3 . It is interesting to see that with some distributions, two equivalent PN functions give the same error masking probability and with the others it can give different ones. However, polynomials 3 + + 1 and 3 + 2 + 1 are reciprocal of each other and they are the only primitive polynomials for = 3.
For most distributions, the maximum values of the function ( , ) = −1 and ( , ) = 3 are close to each other (disributions ϕ 2 ( ), ϕ 3 ( ), ϕ 4 ( )). If we look at the distribution of ( ) for function ( , ) = −1 and ( , ) = 3 ( Figure 4 ), we can see that distribution does not coincide fully. However, as shown in Figure 4 , we can select error classes with the same values of error masking probability for both functions.
However, for distribution of input codewords ϕ 1 ( ) = { 0.84, ∈ [31; 34] 0.260, ℎ , the maximum of error masking probability has a high value for function ( , ) = −1 ( Figure 5 ). In comparison with the other encoding functions, max ≠0 ( ) for function ( , ) = −1 under distribution 1 is very high, therefore using of this function under distribution ϕ 1 is undesirable.
The nonuniform distributions of input codeword can lead to jumps in the probability distribution of the error masking ( ). Figure 6 represents the case of correlation between the input distribution and injected error that give rise in error masking probability distribution. For example, we can see an error with a decimal representation 84 in Figure 6 or, in other words, the error with maximal ( ) for the distribution of ϕ 5 ( ) and an irreducible polynomial 100101.
Behavior of the error masking probability for encoding functions ( , ) = and ( , ) = −3 is also largely the same. As shown in Table 2 for these functions the maximums of error masking probability for all distributions except the Bernouilli coincide. Distribution of ( ) are different, but as in the case of functions Table 3 . Comparison of the error masking probability for the functions ( , ) = and ( , ) = −1 for value = 4 over irreducible polynomial 4 + 3 + 1. g denotes the codeword of code and ϕ( ) probability of codeword occurrence
From Table 3 we can see that function ( , ) = has a lower error masking probability for all distributions.
Comparison of PN functions for r=5 over six irreducible polynomials
We have chosen one function with = 5 and tried all primitive polynomials in Table 4 . Table 4 . Comparison of maximum error masking probability for the functions ( , ) = for value = 5 over all irreducible polynomial in (2 5 ). Number of vector with hamming weight 5 in Table 5 . Comparison of maximum error masking probability for the functions ( , ) = −1 for value = 5 over all irreducible polynomial in (2 5 ). Number of vector with hamming weight 5 in (2 10 ) equal to 252. = ( , ) is information part of codeword = ( , ( )). The denotion ( ) means the Hamming weight of vector
In the first line of Table 4 , the irreducible polynomial of ( 2 5 ) is presented. Polynomials are represented via binary coefficients, that is, for example, the 100101 denotes the polynomial 5 + 2 + 1. The first column contains the distribution of input distributions ϕ( ). We made a simulation with a distribution uniform over some strict subset of ( 2 2 ) and null outside, for instance the set of those ( , ) of Hamming weight = 5. A number of binary sequences with the length of 10 bits and hamming weight of 5 equals to 252. So, probability of occurrence for vector with weight 5 equals to 1/252. Each column presents the irreducible К. Карлет, А.Б. Левина, С.В. Таранов Научно-технический вестник информационных технологий, механики и оптики, 2017, том 17, № 6 1061 polynomial and corresponding maximum value of error masking probability for each distribution of input codeword.
For distribution ϕ 1 ( ) we get the different values of max ( ), however, for another distribution maximum of error masking it does not depend on irreducible polynomial.
Based on the measurement results carried out in this section for codes constructed with the MaoranaMcFarland functions, the following conclusions can be drawn:  Tables 4 and 5 show how the changing of an irreducible polynomial that is used to construct codewords effects on the probability of error masking. From the tables we see that for the same distribution of input codewords, the using of reciprocal irreducible polynomials gives an equal maximum value of the error masking probability. Nonreciprocal irreducible polynomials give the masking probability maximum that is different from the other irreducible polynomials for same input codeword distribution (Values max ( ) differ by at most 0.01).  the set of input codeword distribution, codespace and irreducible polynomial can give jumps in the probability distribution of the error masking ( ).The examples of jumps can be seen in Figure 6 for error with a decimal representation 84.  the probability distribution of the error masking given by equivalent codes coincide up to permutations (Figures 4 and 5 ).  max ( ) for equivalent codespaces are equal for identical irreducible polynomials, for example, the functions −1 and 3 or and −3 in Tables 2 and 3 .
Conclusion
AMD codes based on PN functions are considered as the object of research. AMD codes present a new method of ensuring integrity for structural elements of device for processing, storing and transferring information, such as cache memory, RAM, logic and arithmetic elements in circuits. In this work AMD codes based on PN functions were tested for stability, made an overview of changes in the input codeword distribution, irreducible polynomials used to generate code spaces. As a result, cases were identified when it is possible to reduce the stability of code constructions. Such cases are possible if the coding function, the input codeword distribution or irreducible polynomial is changing. These cases should be taken into account when methods of integrity ensuring based on the considered code constructions are designed.
